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1
Introduction
“For several decades, the Jewish establishment has asked
American Jews to check their liberalism at Zionism’s door,
and now, to their horror, they are finding that many young
Jews have checked their Zionism instead.”1
-Peter Beinart
After more than 60 years of existence and significant political
transformations within both the Jewish State and the region in which it sits,
the task of arriving at a conclusive definition for the label ‘Pro-Israel’, in the
American context, is an increasingly difficult one. There is no doubt,
however, that the definition is indeed changing—and not just among peace
activists or scholars but in mainstream politics, political lobbying
organizations, and on-campus student organizations. This thesis will
examine both what this ‘new’ Pro-Israel definition looks like and how it is
distinct from the ‘old’ definition. Most importantly, this thesis will examine
the legacy of the ‘old’ definition, its implications on U.S. foreign policy in the
Middle East, and what types of policies may be expected as we are ushered
into an era potentially dominated by this ‘new’ definition.
At the risk of over-simplifying the two definitions, I hope to outline
the basic parameters of both in order to establish the distinction and
examine the degree to which each definition is a result of political, social, and
religious changes in the ‘pro-Israel’ community of the United States.2 The
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Peter Beinart, “The Failure of the American Jewish Establishment,” The New York Review of
Books, June 10, 2010, pp. 1
2 Because discussion of Israel has proven to be highly controversial in political and academic
circles in the United States, it should be noted that this thesis is in no way meant to serve as a
commentary on the policies of the Israeli Government or the Palestinian Authority. Nor will
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‘old’ Pro-Israel camp (1) focused primarily on the security concerns of the
Israeli state, (2) often ignored, dodged, or outright rejected the notion of a
sovereign Palestinian state (3) emphasized, above all else, the ‘Jewish’ nature
of the state. The ‘new’ Pro-Israel camp tends to (1) focus primarily on
achieving ‘peace’ in Israel-Palestine (2) accept a Palestinian state as requisite
in achieving this ‘peace’ (3) emphasize, above all else, the ‘liberal’ and
‘democratic’ nature of the Israeli state.
This thesis involves chronicling the ‘evolution’ of a term in U.S.
political discourse and must, therefore, be examined in distinct periods of
time. The first section will cover the period between the foundations of the
earliest puritan colonies in the present-day United States up until the
establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, during which ‘Zionism’ appears
in various forms, corresponding to events and trends in the global Jewish
community. The second section covers the period between 1948 and the
1993 Oslo Accords—a landmark agreement that established, for the first
time, the basis for a two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The
final section will examine the period between 1993 and the present day,
which witnessed a breakdown of peace negotiations and radical political
changes in the Middle East. As we will see, developments in the U.S.-Israeli

this paper challenge the allegiances of Jewish or Christian Americans to the state of Israel
and will avoid any value judgments on personal or collective political opinions. It will,
however, involve extensive analysis of the mainstream political and academic commentary
on the above issues—which involves charges of racism, anti-Semitism, ethnic cleansing,
apartheid, and other deplorable labels that arise when discussing the various voices in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
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relationship and the definition of ‘Pro-Israel’ in the United States generally
correspond to military conflicts, annexation/relinquishment of territory,
peace treaties, and shifts in regional political systems.
American Zionism before 1948
Despite its connections to a religious nation that emerged in antiquity,
political Zionism as we have come to encounter it is a modern phenomenon
that has its origins not as much in Biblical scripture as it does in the
prevalence of anti-Semitism throughout Europe (particularly in the East) in
the late 19th century. Yet, long before political Zionism gained traction within
mainstream Jewish-American political discourse, America offered it’s own
distinct refuge for Jews (as well as other religious minorities) seeking asylum
from discrimination that powerful religious institutions and emerging
nation-states in Europe had perpetuated.
For the former Commentary magazine editor Norman Podhoretz, the
freedom available to European Jewry in America was unprecedented:
“In America there was no trace, or any remotely functional equivalent,
of the kind of autocratic power that had been one of the two great
enemies of the Jews of Europe from time immemorial. . . government
acted as a bulwark against, and not an enforcer of, any form of legal
discrimination against its Jewish citizens.”3
But this ‘Golden Land’, as Podhoretz calls it, was not viewed as such solely
based on the unrivaled freedom it offered to the Jewish people—it was, in
effect, the 18th century reincarnation of the ‘lost’ nation of Israel. The
emphasis on and even obsession with the texts of the Old Testament is
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unmistakable when examining the legal documents, charters, and writings of
the early Puritan pilgrims to America who, despite maintaining a Protestant
Christian identity, saw themselves as the new ‘Children of Israel’. Over half
of the statutes within the 1655 legal code of the New Haven colony include
references or citations from the Old Testament, while only three percent
came from the New Testament.4 The first Massachusetts Bay Colony
Governor, John Winthrop, frequently alluded to the covenant between God
and Abraham in Genesis, declaring in 1679: “the ways of God towards this
His people are in many respects like unto His dealings with Israel of old.”5
New England served not merely as a ‘metaphor’ for Israel, but as “the very
metaphysical translation…of that ‘typical,’ ‘figurative’ or ‘ceremonial’ land
and nation” that existed in Palestine at the time.6 Early on, the Puritan
Christian affinity with the narratives of the Old Testament fostered its own
brand of ‘Zionism’ which not only worked to create a favorable religious
environment for asylum-seeking European Jews, but paralleled the ancient
story of the Israelites’ exodus from Egypt into the ‘Promised Land’. Just as
the Children of Israel had escaped the Pharaoh’s wrath and crossed the Red

Max Baker and Paul Masserman, The Jews Come to America (New York: Bloch Publishing
Company, 1932)
5 Abraham Katsh, The Biblical Heritage of American Democracy (New York: Ktav Publishing
House, 1977), pp. 32
6 Samuel H Levine, “Palestine in the Literature of the United States to 1867” Early History of
Zionism In America, Ed. Isidore S. Meyer. (New York: American Jewish Historical Society and
Theodor Herzl Foundation, 1958): 25
4

5
Sea to enter the land of Canaan, the Puritans had fled from the rule of the
English king and crossed the Atlantic Ocean to settle in America.7
Despite the allusions to a ‘New Promised Land’ in America among
early Christian colonists, the residual anti-Semitism within the European
gentile communities of early America prohibited Jews from embracing
similar notions of a ‘New Israel’. The main difference from the Jews’
experience in Europe, however, was that in America, “Jews did not occupy
that subordinate position alone.”8 The Protestant establishment in the
American colonies placed as many (if not more) restrictions on Catholics as it
did Jews. The Church of England viewed Catholics as “the embodiment of
evil” and worked “first and foremost to ward off Catholic influence in public
life.”9 Even though they shared an ‘inferior’ position similar to that of other
religious minorities, early Jews in America had achieved a status that
constituted “one of the highest that Jews anywhere in the world would
claim.”9 This status would be upheld and reinforced throughout the
revolutionary period, during which the primary leaders and thinkers in the
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To this day, Israeli politicians continue to invoke this parallel when describing the U.S.Israeli relationship. In a May/June 2011 issue of Foreign Affairs, Michael Oren, Israel’s
ambassador to the United States, draws upon the narrative of Plymouth rock settlers
committing themselves to “studying Hebrew and bridging the Old and New Canaans—the
Holy Land and America.” In addition to citing the Zionist sympathies of Thomas Jefferson,
John Adams, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman, among others, Oren
asserts that many Americans are similarly drawn to the Zionist narrative of pioneering, in
which they hear “echoes of their own national narrative.”
8 Hasia R. Diner, The Jews of the United States: 1654 to 2000 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2004), pp. 23
9 The Jews of the United States, pp. 24
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new American democracy sought to secure equal rights for all men—most
notably through the “divorce between the religious matters and public life.”10
By the early 19th century, however, some American Jews had begun to
construct utopian visions of a new, emancipated Jewish nation in America. In
1825, Mordecai Noah, high sheriff of New York, issued a proclamation to
world Jewry in which he offered them “an asylum in a free and powerful
country, where ample protection is secured to their persons, their property,
and religious rights”—a ‘land of milk and honey’ where “Israel may repose in
peace.”11 Noah proposed a twelve-by-seven mile stretch of land in Grand
Island, New York to serve as a ‘City of Refuge’ upon which a proper Jewish
state would be built. Although Noah’s proclamation and subsequent attempt
to finance the construction of a ‘Jewish state’ in northern New York was
followed by international media and Jews worldwide, it was rejected almost
from the very beginning as an ‘unrealistic venture’. While Jews had finally
secured a geographic area that they could identify as a safe haven for
uninhibited religious observance, America could not, by any means, be
revered as a ‘New Israel’ for world Jewry. It would take radical social and
political changes in 19th century Europe to foster the movement we
understand today as ‘Zionism’.
The emergence of political Zionism is most often associated with
Theodor Herzl’s 1896 publication of Der Judenstaat (“The Jewish State”),
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which cast aside any illusions that European Jewry could seek refuge from
growing anti-Semitism through assimilation. After witnessing the
demonization of the assimilated Jewish French military officer Alfred Dreyfus
(and, by extension, all French Jews), Herzl concluded that the only solution to
the ‘Jewish question’ in Europe was to establish a sovereign state so that the
Jews would cease to operate as a ‘nation within a nation’, as they had in
Europe up to that point. In Herzl’s view, the goal of Zionism was to gain
immediate (rather than eventual) sovereignty in the form of a state so that “a
Jewish society and culture organically tied to a territory” would form and
give rise to a Jewish nationalist movement.12 Far from being classified as
religious fundamentalists, the secular European founders of Zionism
developed the ideology based on “symbols and codes borrowed from the
nineteenth-century European version of Jewish religion and ethnicity,”
drawing upon the “religiously preserved collective memory” of Zion as the
territorial base for building the new Jewish state.13
Zionism in Eastern Europe emerged separately and earlier than the
intellectual movements in Western Europe. After the outbreak of pogroms in
1881, Russian Jews faced with violence began to embrace Zionism as a
solution to the discrimination and hostility they experienced. In 1882, the
Russian Zionist pioneer Leon Pinsker published Autoemancipation, calling for
a return to Zion and positing that “until the Jews had a homeland of their own
12

Jacques Kornberg, Theodor Herzl: From Assimilation to Zionism (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1993), pp. 165
13 Baruch Kimmerling, The Invention and Decline of Israeliness: State, Society, and the Military
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp. 4
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they would function as a pariah people subject to whatever hostility and ill
will others chose to inflict on them.”14 The idea of ‘Diaspora nationalism’ that
developed in Eastern Europe called for Jewish political and civil rights and
cultural autonomy within already existing European states—a doctrine that
the World Zionist Organization adopted alongside the plan to ‘return to
Palestine’ at its inaugural convention.
As the First Zionist Congress convened in Basel, Switzerland in 1897,
Zionism was being hotly debated in the United States. While the Zionist
movement had already gained significant support among the diaspora
communities in Eastern Europe and the assimilated, intellectual communities
in Western Europe, Zionism in America remained relatively weak and
fractured before World War I. Building a mass support for Zionism in the
United States could not rely on notions of nationalism as it did in Europe, for
the “underlying idea that Jews are a separate nationality” was untenable
within the American context, where “nation and state were synonymous
concepts.”15 At its first meeting in 1898, the Federation of American Zionists
made it clear that any type of ‘nationalism’ embraced in the American setting
would not conflict with Jewish-American identity: “The restoration of Zion as
the legitimate aspiration of scattered Israel, in no way conflicts with our
loyalty to the land in which we dwell or may dwell at any time.”16 American
Zionism in its early stages served primarily as a symbol of solidarity with
14
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European Jewry who, unlike Jewish-Americans, experienced a need to return
to the ‘homeland’ in Palestine due to the increasingly oppressive legal and
social restrictions placed on them.
While the outbreak of World War I slowed the development of the
World Zionist Organization in Europe, vast social changes within the Jewish
community of the United States during and after the war brought about a
new revitalization of American Zionism. Due to a restriction on Eastern
European immigration during the war, the number of U.S.-born Jews
outnumbered those who were foreign-born for the first time in 1920. A new
generation of American-born, English speaking, educated, and suburban Jews
found themselves facing the same discrimination and anti-Semitic sentiments
as their forefathers and relatives in Europe, despite having improved their
socio-economic status within American society. Because of this continued
marginalization, the second generation embraced Zionism as a way to “justify
the separate existence of the Jewish community in the United States” and
provide “a self-respect denied to the group by the dominant society and its
culture.”17 This allowed them to retain a ‘Jewish-American’ identity while
simultaneously embracing the principle of ‘Palestinianism’ within Zionism—
that is, the principle that calls for world Jewry to “help build up Palestine as a
Jewish national home.”17
This sentiment manifested itself through the leadership of Louis
Brandeis, who assumed leadership of the Federation of American Zionists in
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1915 and proclaimed, “Every American Jew who aids in advancing the Jewish
settlement in Palestine, though he feels that neither he nor his descendants
will ever live there, will be a better man and a better American for doing
so.”18 From the beginning, American Zionism was distinct from its European
counterpart in that it endorsed Palestinianism over ‘Diaspora nationalism’ as
a solution to worldwide Jewish suffering, for a ‘return’ to Palestine did not
conflict with the community’s allegiance to the United States, where they had
experienced unprecedented prosperity. After witnessing Woodrow Wilson’s
strong support of the 1917 Balfour Declaration, the American Jewish
community essentially abandoned any lingering anti-Zionist sentiments that
had resulted from the debate with European Zionists at the turn of the
century.
American Jewish labor leaders, philanthropists, and even leaders
within the Reform synagogue19 began to embrace Zionism in greater
numbers and to a greater degree during the interwar period. With the
establishment of the Zionist Organization of America in 1918, the support of
a Jewish homeland in Palestine became institutionalized as a “basic value of
American Jewish marginal culture.”20 The generation that had faced an
identity ‘crisis’ in light of persisting anti-Semitism in America had found a
18
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form of nationalism to which they could subscribe—a nationalism that
evolved from a “new self-consciousness” that was developed to “mirror the
newly realized situation.”21 It is important to note that this sense of
nationalism in the American Jewish community developed independent of
European Zionism and grew primarily out of a revitalized ethnic identity
after World War I. A Palestinian mandate under British control fostered a
greater optimism among American Jews who sought to realize the goal of
establishing a Jewish homeland, not necessarily for themselves but at the
very least for their coreligionists in Europe.
As we can see, American support for establishing the State of Israel
existed long before anti-Semitism in Europe reached its apex in the form of
the Holocaust. It is necessary to nullify, therefore, the idea that the creation
of Israel was predicated solely on the events of the Holocaust, for the support
for such a state had gained substantial strength in the United States and
elsewhere prior to and completely independent of the extermination of twothirds of Europe’s Jewish population.22 The effect of the Holocaust on
American Zionism, however, would be a significant factor in the
establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.
Perhaps most profoundly, the Holocaust altered the support base for
Zionism to the point that “differences over ideology, assimilation or religion
Everett V. Stonequist, “The Problem of the Marginal Man” The American Journal of
Sociology 41.1 (1935): 10-11.
22 For over two thousand years, the Judaic principle calling for the “love of Zion” persisted
throughout the diaspora. This principal tenant predates the Holocaust and institutionalized
European anti-Semitism, tracing its roots back to the beginning of the exodus of the Jewish
community from the original Eretz Israel during the Babylonian occupation during the 6th
century B.C.E.
21
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that had previously animated heated debates over Jewish statehood” became
irrelevant.23 As they watched the fate of their coreligionists across the
Atlantic, the American Jewish community was effectively ‘stifled’ in voicing
opposition to the immigration restrictions that the United States had placed
on European refugees. Out of fear that petitioning the government for a
change in policy would foster more anti-Semitism in the United States,
American Jews turned to Zionism as a means of supporting Jewish refugees
escaping from execution in Europe. In 1942, the American Palestine
Committee reaffirmed their support for an American policy that called for a
Jewish national home in Palestine, and by 1944 a pro-Zionist policy was
officially endorsed by the majority of the U.S. congress and more than 3,000
non-Jewish organizations.24
By the mid-1940s, as the results of Hitler’s campaign of European
Jewish genocide became readily available for the world to see, American
support for a sovereign Israeli state may have seemed to be a foregone
conclusion. Within president Harry Truman’s administration, however, there
was a great deal of vacillation between two policies regarding the
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. While members of Truman’s
cabinet (most notably Clark Clifford) advocated for a strong pro-Zionist
stance, the Departments of Defense and State (along with the Military) urged
against adopting such a policy out of concern that it may alienate Arab
states.24 Truman’s Secretary of State, George Marshall, believed that ‘for
23
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strategic reasons’ the United States should be “more even-handed in its view
of the future of Palestine.”25 Truman’s administration changed course
radically two months ahead of Israel’s Declaration (and War) of
Independence, indicating its support for a United Nations trusteeship over
Palestine, rather than the establishment of an independent Jewish state. By
the 1948 election, however, the need to secure the Jewish vote (which had
historically been aligned with the Democratic party but was by no means
‘guaranteed’) far outweighed the concerns posited by his foreign policy
advisors. After fully recognizing Israel’s independence on May 14, 1948,
Truman embarked on a massive campaign up until the November election in
which he promised “extensive American support for Israel” to an American
Jewish population that overwhelmingly identified itself as ‘Zionist’, if even
only at the philanthropic level.26
By 1948, Zionism had become ingrained in the psyche of the American
Jewish community and served as a unifying cultural focus by which American
policy toward Israel came to be defined. At this point, Arab rejection of the
1947 partition and refugees from the War of Independence (or, from the
Arab perspective, the ‘Catastrophe’) were issues of little concern to American
Jewry, apart, perhaps, from academic circles. In 1945, acclaimed political
theorist Hannah Arendt warned that if political Zionism failed to “normalize
the situation of the Jews in America,” then support of Zionism may effectively

25 Michael C. Desch, “The Myth of Abandonent: The Use and Abuse of the Holocaust
Analogy,” Security Studies Vol. 15, No. 1 (January-March 2006): 112
26 “Zionism and American Jews,” pp. 9
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be thrown into ‘reverse’—that is, anti-Semitism would resurge if the loyalty
or allegiance of American Jews came into question.26 While such a ‘reversal’
may have never manifested itself in any real terms, the issue of anti-Semitism
did not, by any means, disappear. The distinction between anti-Semitism and
anti-Zionism continues to animate the debate over American support of
Israel to the present day.
American Zionism after Israel: from Independence to Oslo 1948-1993
The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 imbued the American
Jewish community with unprecedented Zionist fervor. Although support for
Israel within the American Jewish community consisted primarily of
monetary donations and various forms of political activism, thousands of
American Jews were beginning to show their support by relocating to the
new Jewish state. Within the lifespan of the British Mandate of Palestine
(1919-1947), an estimated 11,000 American Jews immigrated to Israel, most
of whom were motivated by Zionism rather than religious ideologies. After
1948, however, the rate at which American Jews began relocating to Israel
nearly doubled; over 3,600 Americans moved to Israel between 1950 and
1959, averaging out to 360 per year—50 percent higher than the yearly rate
during the entire mandatory period.27
In one of the few empirical studies of American olim (immigrants)
throughout the 1950s and 60s, Gerald Engel found a distinct lack of criticism
of American society among respondents, indicating that ‘pull’ factors, rather
Chaim I. Waxman, American Aliya: Portrait of an Innovative Migration Movement (Detroit:
Wayne State University Press, 1989), pp. 78
27
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than ‘push’ factors, served as the predominant motivators for Aliyah. More
than 80 percent were attracted by the idea of a Jewish homeland, 75 percent
were motivated by the concept of Israel as the land of the Bible, and 71
percent were attracted by Jewish education; almost twice as many indicated
feeling ‘much’ attraction to all aspects of Jewish life in Israel than those who
indicated they only felt ‘some’ attraction.28 Most importantly, however, Engel
found that the post-1948 American olim were coming increasingly from nonZionist homes and, on the whole, had less formal affiliation with Zionist
youth organizations. The declining influence of this brand of ‘formal Zionism’
is evidence for the first major shift in Zionism’s reach and influence within
the American Jewish community.
In post-war America, Zionism became less a fundamentalist religious
ideology than a new centralized and revitalized expression of Jewish cultural
identity. By 1948, Mordecai Kaplan’s prophetic classification of the Jewish
state in Palestine as the ‘first zone’ of worldwide Jewish life had come to
fruition. Kaplan, an influential American reconstructionist Rabbi and thinker,
declared in his 1934 book Judaism As A Civilization: “In Palestine only will it
be possible for the Jew, if he so chooses, to live entirely within his people’s
civilization.”29 America, for Kaplan, allowed Judaism to survive “only as a
subordinate civilization”—one subject to the dominant interests of American
life and identity. While conceding that Jewish life outside of Palestine was
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achievable, Kaplan stressed the need for the Jew to immigrate to Palestine if
“he wants to live as a Jew only, and to be free of the need of reckoning with
the civilization of any other people.”30 Yet, despite the lofty promises of
unprecedented individual and collective sovereignty, immigrants to the new
Jewish state were faced with an inevitable ‘reckoning’, of sorts, with the
American civilization.
Jewish immigration to Israel during this period, despite its ideological
significance, was far too scant to be considered a primary factor in the U.S.
Government’s interest in fostering a ‘special relationship’ with the state. In
the two decades directly following Israeli independence, the relationship
bore little resemblance to the ‘unbreakable’ bond affirmed by both U.S.
President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in
contemporary diplomatic discourse.
Early attempts at establishing an effective ‘Israel lobby’ in Washington
were mired in controversy from the start. Rumors that President
Eisenhower had launched an investigation into the American Zionist Council
for its alleged use of tax-exempt funds for lobbying purposes tarnished the
organization’s reputation to the point that it was re-organized and repackaged into the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs (AZPAC) in
1954.31 While such investigations never actually took place, the rift between

30
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the Eisenhower administration and mainstream American Zionist
organizations had nonetheless become palpable by the mid 1950s.
Rather than pursuing the traditional ‘sticks-and-carrots’ diplomacy to
develop U.S. relationships with emerging anti-Soviet allies in the Middle East,
the Eisenhower administration did not offer any promises of arms delivery
or unilateral security guarantees to Israel in exchange for its compliance with
various American demands—including territorial concessions in the Negev, a
cessation of raids against Egypt and Jordan, and acceptance of an unspecified
number of Palestinian refugees.32 Such a posturing was justified within the
framework of long-term U.S. ambitions to form alliances with Arab states (at
that point unanimously and unequivocally opposed to Israel’s existence) to
curb Soviet power and influence in the Middle East. In a top-secret memo by
the National Security Council on July 23, 1954, the Executive Secretary
explicitly outlines U.S. ambitions to “progressively reduce the amount of
economic aid furnished to Israel, so as to bring it into impartial relationship
to aid to others in the area.”33 In both public and private diplomatic
iterations of U.S. policy, it is clear that the U.S. was not interested in aligning
itself with Israel out of fear of alienating other Middle Eastern nations over
which it competed for influence.

32
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While the Eisenhower’s markedly mistrusting, even hostile, attitude
toward Israel can account for much of the lobby’s ineffectiveness in the
1950s, the effect of ideological discrepancies between AZPAC (which became
AIPAC in 1959) and the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) should be
recognized as a barrier to the early development of a unified ‘Israel lobby’ in
the United States. Early on, the ZOA (an umbrella group of the World Zionist
Organization, discussed in the previous section) expressed concerns that
AIPAC’s dominance would risk “surrendering control to Jews who were
willing to help fund Jewish charities, schools, and kibbutzim but were less
dedicated to the traditional Zionist idea of Israel as a sovereign Jewish
state.”31 Although the rift between the principal actors in the fledging proIsrael lobby was not fully reconciled until the 1967 war, significant
developments in the political landscape of the Middle East and
(consequently) American policy toward Israel in the early 1960s began to
form the foundations for the current U.S. alliance with the Jewish state.
John F. Kennedy began his presidency with a distinct lack of ‘external
constraints’ (compared to those of Eisenhower) in pursuing a policy of Soviet
containment in the Middle East. Despite establishing successful relationships
with regimes in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, the Soviet Union was faced with intraArab rivalries that threatened to break its base of influence.34 For Kennedy,
this meant increased flexibility in using Israel as a political issue in the 1960
Presidential election in opposition to then-Vice President Richard Nixon, who
34
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shared Eisenhower’s lingering fear that a close U.S. relationship with Israel
would further alienate key Arab states. Of course, with this increased
flexibility also came an increased dependence on support from the American
Jewish community—an electorate that Kennedy relied on more than any U.S.
president up to that point. Kennedy took advantage of an invitation from the
Zionist Organization of America to speak at its national convention in the
August before the 1960 elections (an invitation which Nixon declined) and
used the platform to express his commitment to Zionism:
“Israel has not been merely a Jewish cause—any more than Irish
independence was the cause merely of those of Irish descent. Because
wherever freedom exists, there we are all committed—and wherever
it is in danger, there we are all in danger. The ideals of Zionism have
in the last half-century been endorsed by both parties and Americans
of all ranks in all sections. Friendship for Israel is not a partisan
matter, it is a national commitment.”35
Unsurprisingly, Kennedy earned more than 80 percent of the Jewish vote in
1960—more so, as Norman Podhoretz posits, out of anti-Nixon and antiRepublican sentiments than pro-Kennedy enthusiasm.36 However,
Kennedy’s ‘pro-Israel’ political posturing before the election was largely
inconsistent with his decisions throughout his short presidency; he opposed
the Israeli government on policy toward Egypt, the status of Jerusalem and
refugees, as well as a key UN Security Council vote which condemned Israel
for its 1962 raid into Syria. Nevertheless, Kennedy’s rhetorical commitment
to the state of Israel and Zionism secured broad support for himself, his
successor, and the Democratic Party up until 1967, when the dynamics of the
35
36
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Arab-Israeli conflict changed radically and so too did the United States’
relationship with Israel.
The effect of the Six-Day War on American Jewish affinity with the
state of Israel cannot be overstated. As Journalist Thomas Friedman boldly
declared in his acclaimed 1989 book From Beirut to Jerusalem: “American
Jews could not embrace Israel enough…The impact of Israel on American
Jews was so powerful that for many of them Israel actually replaced Torah,
synagogue, and prayer as the carrier of their Jewish identity.”37 The Israeli
victory in June 1967 left the state in control of the Sinai Peninsula, Golan
Heights, Gaza Strip, West Bank, and (most importantly) all of Jerusalem. In
the American press, allusions to the tale of David and Goliath were in no
short supply, narrating the miraculous story of a “tiny David slaying a huge, if
rather awkward, Goliath.”38 The covers of Life, Time and Newsweek
magazines ran full-page portraits of the triumphant General Yitzhak Rabin at
the Western Wall in military clothing, while the New York Times dubbed him
“Hero of Sinai.”39 Through the American media lens, the Israeli Defense
Forces (military might and sophistication notwithstanding) were lauded for
their virtues as the persistent narrative of ‘David’ resonated in a U.S.
population “accustomed to watching decades of westerns in movie theaters
and on television with their lone heroes who fight successfully against
37
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incredible odds.”40 The outcome of the Six-Day War created an environment
in which “Israel moved from the periphery to the center in the structure and
culture of the American Jewish community.”41 Among college students, who
were largely opposed to the war in Vietnam, there was unprecedented
animation over the issue of U.S. support for Israel. Hundreds of Jewish
students began to hold mass meetings on campuses across the country,
volunteering to go to Israel to help the war effort and spreading awareness
for the “need to wage what the students saw as a very different and just war,”
in comparison to Vietnam.42 Yet, this newfound sense of pride among much
of the American Jewish community during and after the war would translate
into more than just a revitalized collective identity.
In the period between 1967 and the 1973 Yom Kippur War, AIPAC
was still fighting an uphill battle to secure increased aid for Israel from the
U.S. government. Indeed, Israel had proven itself to be a “’viable,
independent nation, and not a ‘puppet nation’ propped up and manipulated
by U.S. power”43 and therefore more of a strategic ally in securing a base of
U.S. influence in the Middle East. However, President Nixon’s lingering
concerns of alienating other Arab states prohibited AIPAC from successfully
lobbying to increase the U.S. foreign aid package to Israel from $25 million to
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$50 million.44 The ‘$36 Billion Bargain’ achieved during Nixon’s tenure in
office had little, if anything, to do with the influence of AIPAC, which was in
debt before 1967. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger notes in his
memoirs that president Nixon “delighted in telling associates and visitors
that the ‘Jewish lobby’ had no effect on him.”45 After 1973, however,
contributions remained at or above $2 billion annually, spiking the very next
year at $4.5 billion.46 As Israel faced increased hostility, including surprise
attacks from Syria on Yom Kippur or international terrorism against Israeli
citizens in 1970 and 1972, the overwhelming need to secure foreign aid to
Israel could no longer be ignored.
After 1973, AIPAC took center stage as the voice of the ‘pro-Israel’
community in the United States. The organization grew from a staff of 12
lobbyists and a $300,000 annual budget in 1973 to a staff of 80 and an annual
budget of more than $5 million in 1985.44 At this time, the organization
became very powerful, as any ‘threat’ to cut military aid or the size of the U.S.
annual aid package to Israel “came to be defined as a threat to Israel’s
survival.”47 In addition, politicians quickly recognized the political
expediency of being a ‘friend’ of Israel on Capitol Hill when any bill involving
aid to Israel came to a vote. As one senator expressed in 1976: “There's no
political advantage in not signing. If you do sign, you don't offend anyone. If
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you don't, you might offend some Jews in your state.”48 While Jews make up
approximately two percent of the overall American electorate, the
importance of the ‘Jewish vote’ is largely related to their campaign
contributions.49 One senator from a sparsely populated Western state said
although there are only one or two thousand Jewish citizens in his state,
“they all contribute to my campaign.”48 This unified conception of ‘pro-Israel’
(i.e.—voting for any bill that increased aid to Israel) in congress would,
however, increasingly complicate the issue of U.S. support for the Jewish
state.
As the American historian Hasia Diner points out, the ability of the
‘Israel’ issue to “shape American Jewish consciousness” resulted in a stifling
of dissent among American Jews:
“For a community that historically had been open to debate and to
differing approaches to common problems, the taboo on criticizing
specific Israeli policies compromised communal democracy and
shattered even the semblance of unity.”50
To counter the threat of censorship, a group of politically active American
Jews founded the Breira or “alternative” organization to foster discussion
about sensitive subjects that had become taboo within the American ‘proIsrael’ camp that developed in the early 1970s—namely, Israel’s relationship
with the Palestinians, refugees, and the growing number of settlements in the
West Bank. By 1977, the organization had a membership of more than
48

Mary A. Barberis, “The Arab-Israeli Battle on Capitol Hill,” Virginia Quarterly Review Vol.
52, No. 2 (Spring 1976): 209
49 This is especially true in ‘swing states,’ where a few votes can mean the difference
between winning and losing a congressional seat.
50 The Jews of the United States, pp. 327

24
12,000, including Rabbis and other Jewish community leaders. However,
their presence and expressed ambitions to enter the mainstream American
dialogue on Israel was met with rebuke and hostility from prominent Jewish
leaders. One Rabbi accused Breira of giving “aid and comfort to those who
would cut aid to Israel and leave it defenseless before murderers and
terrorists,” while the prominent Rabbi and scholar Arthur Hertzberg refused
to speak at a conference of the American Jewish Congress because a member
of the Breira organization had been invited.51 After considerable
demonization in the mainstream Jewish press and accusations of ‘selfhatred’, Breira members were effectively blacklisted from speaking at
national Jewish events and eventually re-emerged as the New Jewish Agenda
in 1980, by which time other organizations such as American Friends of
Peace Now had begun to advance the issue of Palestinian rights within the
American Jewish dialogue on Israel, albeit with similar criticism and
resistance. Yet while nascent ‘pro-Israel’ groups willing to criticize the
policies of the Israeli government (particularly after the right-wing Likud
party gained control of the Knesset in 1977) were struggling to make their
voices heard in the American mainstream, another religious group was
beginning to gain considerable influence over U.S. policy toward Israel.
Christian Zionism: Origins and Ascent
Christian Zionism has its roots in early 19th century England, when
evangelical Christian thinkers began to embrace the idea that the “Second
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Advent” or “Second Coming” of Christ would occur before the new
millennium. The role of the Jews in Biblical prophecy became central to the
‘premillennialists’—with whom the Calvinist doctrine of the divine “election”
of the Jews resonated greatly.52 The persistence of this newfound
philosemitism eventually laid the ideological foundations for a religious
justification for Christian Zionism that, at the very least, motivated the
prominent British politician Lord Shaftesbury to show public support for
Jewish ambitions to establish a national homeland in Palestine. Although
Shaftesbury died in 1885 (just four years after the assassination of Czar
Alexander II and the out break of anti-Jewish pogroms in Russia), his
contribution to Christian Zionism left a monumental impact on the British
evangelicals—so much so that at the Fourth Zionist Congress in 1900,
Theodor Herzl proudly proclaimed: “England, mighty England, free England,
with its world embracing outlook will understand us and our aspirations.”53
Of the ten members of the British War Cabinet that issued the Balfour
Declaration in 1917, six (including Arthur Balfour himself) came from
evangelical Calvinist backgrounds and were undoubtedly influenced by 19th
century conceptions of what would come to be known as Christian Zionism.54
Just as the Six-Day War had revitalized American Jewish identity, so
too did the aftermath of the June 1967 war revive evangelical Christian
interest in Biblical prophecy. Nelson Bell, editor of the evangelical journal
52
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Christianity Today, wrote shortly after the war: “That for the first time in the
more than two thousand years Jerusalem is now completely in the hands of
the Jews gives a student of the Bible a thrill and a renewed faith in the
accuracy and validity of the Bible.”55 The doctrine of dispensationalism—
that is, belief in a distinct period constituting the ‘end of times’—became a
prominent theme in the writings and speeches of American evangelicals,
most notably Hal Lindsey, who called the State of Israel ‘the fuse of
Armageddon.’ Despite his wariness toward the eschatological implications of
evangelical Christian doctrine, retired Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion
hosted a conference in 1971 for American evangelical clergy in Jerusalem—a
meeting inspired by Lindsey’s book The Late Great Planet Earth published
the previous year.
Yet, aside from renewed interest in strict textual interpretation, the
1970s and 80s were largely characterized by a resurgence of the ‘Christian
Right’ in the United States. In 1979, Jerry Falwell founded the Moral
Majority, an evangelical lobbying group whose purpose was to promote the
pursuit of conservative, Christian, and ‘family-oriented’ legislation in the U.S.
congress. The issue of greatest importance to Falwell (a self-proclaimed
‘convert’ to Zionism after 1967), however, was the ‘destiny’ of the State of
Israel, stating in 1984 that “the people of Israel have not only a theological
but also a historical and legal right to the land.”56 Falwell advocated
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restoration of Jewish control of ‘the land’ promised to Abraham in Genesis
15:18—which includes the area between the Nile and the Euphrates. Such a
conception was welcomed warmly by the right-wing Likud government
under Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who developed a close personal and
political friendship with Falwell. In forming this relationship, Begin and
fellow Likud member Ariel Sharon were able to gain support for an
ambitious settlement policy—one that would establish ‘facts on the ground’
in the occupied territories and thus secure expanded final boundaries for the
State of Israel. At a time when the Likud party’s settlement policy faced
considerable resistance from U.S. President Jimmy Carter (and, to a lesser
degree, from Ronald Reagan), Begin could consistently rely on ideological
support from Falwell and his evangelical Moral Majority.
Of course, Falwell’s unrelenting support for Israel was not met
without criticism from dissenting voices within the American Jewish
community. After Begin awarded Falwell with the Jabotinsky Prize in 1980
(the first awarded to a non-Jew), Reform leader Rabbi Alexander Schindler
criticized the emerging alliance between the Israeli Right and the American
Christian Right: “Can someone really be good for Israel when everything else
he says and does is destructive of America and undermines the Jewish
community?”57 Indeed, the fledging acceptance of a two-state solution
among liberal American Jews in the late 1980s meant Falwell had created a
nearly intractable chasm between his evangelical followers and the very
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community to which he pledged full ‘support’. In both the New York Times
and Washington Post, Falwell published a full-page declaration that called for
evangelical Christians to recognize Israel’s ‘divine right to the land,’ and
viewed with ‘grave concern’ any “effort to carve out of the Jewish homeland
another nation or political entity”—thus rendering a Palestinian state
theoretically impossible.58 The Christian Right’s alliance with religious
fundamentalist settlers and Israel’s Likud politicians further complicated
support for Israel among secular, liberal American Jews who, despite finding
a newfound affinity with the Jewish state after 1967, were hardly interested
in the eschatological Christian conception of Israel’s destiny and perhaps
even less interested in the Christian Right’s positions regarding domestic
social and economic policies in the United States.
The rise of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), the outbreak of
the First Intifada in 1987, and the tumultuous six years that followed left
Israel in a radically different position in relation to the ‘Palestinian issue’. As
Palestinian Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat rushed to accept
UN Resolutions 181 and 242 (thus acknowledging Israel’s right to exist “in
peace and security”) it seemed opposition to the existence of a Palestinian
state was no longer a tenable position, even among those who considered
themselves to be in the ‘pro-Israel’ camp. At this time, a shift in diplomatic
relations between Israel and the PLO finally allowed American rabbis,
community activists, and members of prominent Jewish organizations to
58
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“discuss the needs of the Palestinians and the problems posed by West Bank
settlements.”59 Support for an independent Palestinian state among Israelis
rose to an unprecedented 30 percent by 1990, with an increased 10-15
percent supporting withdrawal from all or part of the West Bank and Gaza as
part of a final peace agreement.60 In a sense, the normalization of political
relations between Israel and the PLO and the growth of the domestic peace
movement in Israel corresponded directly with the ‘un-censoring’ of
dissenting opinions in the American Jewish community. While such a shift
may have effectively restored the ‘communal democracy’ within American
Jewry, it also allowed for increased polarization of political opinions
regarding Israel—opinions that would continue to diverge even after the
monumental handshake between Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin on the
White House lawn in September 1993.
American Zionism at the Turn of the Century: from Oslo to Present
1993-2012
Although the ‘peace’ agreement reached in the 1993 Oslo Accords has
yet to be fulfilled, it had a defining impact on the trajectory of U.S.-Israeli
relations throughout the remainder of the 20th century, and into the 21st.
While the prospect of continued and direct negotiations with a legitimate
Palestinian Authority opened up previously unavailable paths of dissent over
Israeli policies within the American Jewish community, for many a ‘particular
stance’ toward Israel became a “communal litmus test of trustworthiness.”59
59
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To be sure, in an April 1993 Commentary article entitled “A Statement
on the Peace Process,” editor Norman Podhoretz, by that time a leading
neoconservative, noted that Jewish criticism of Israel in the 1980s following
the invasion of Lebanon had ‘dangerous political consequences’ within the
context of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations in the early 1990s:
“For one thing, they provided cover for ideological enemies of Israel
and even outright anti-Semites, who were overjoyed at being able to
quote Jews instead of having to rely exclusively on their own easily
discounted forms of vilification. For another thing, the politicians in
Washington…were led to believe that Israel could now be pressured
or even turned on without incurring too high a price in Jewish
political support.”61
This rather cynical view on the effect of Jewish criticism on U.S.-Israeli
relations highlights the dominant right-wing ‘pro-Israel’ anxiety that such
criticism would result in an ‘unbalanced’ peace deal in which Israel would be
forced to relinquish more than it should as part of the Oslo agreements.
Furthermore, Podhoretz offers little direct recognition of the legitimacy of a
Palestinian state, only commenting that “Jews in the Diaspora whose lives are
not on the line lack the moral standing to participate in the debate among
Israelis over their physical security.”62 By rejecting the voices of diaspora
Jews in such a debate (which, ironically, would include his own), Podhoretz
effectively dodges committing to a negative or affirmative position on
Palestinian statehood, replacing it with the vague conclusion that ‘it is not
our decision to make.’
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While such a position theoretically stifles any voice wishing to
comment on the matter, Podhoretz’s criticism of Jewish dissent creates an
important dichotomy of the American Jewish community in the 1990s—
particularly evident in their ‘abandonment’ of George H.W. Bush in the 1992
election. The Commentary editor cites Bush’s misjudgment of the division
among American Jews on Israel, describing a misguided ‘new idea’ that took
root during the Republican’s first and only administration:
“It was that the Jewish community was now more or less evenly split.
On the one side was an old-fashioned establishment in the pocket of
an intransigent and expansionist Israeli government. On the other
side was an almost equally large group of courageous dissidents who
would welcome an American policy aimed at forcing Israel to be more
“flexible” in the pursuit of peace.”61
Podhoretz admits that this division was perceived rather than real—resulting
in Bush’s support within the American Jewish community being cut in half
(from 30 percent in 1988 to 15 percent in 1992). Yet, in the coming decades,
the ‘split’ in the ‘pro-Israel’ camp would develop along similar lines.
The post-Oslo years were characterized by increased animation over
what should and should not be considered ‘anti-Israel’ within American
Jewish discourse. One apparent manifestation of this controversy occurred
in 1997, when the Anti-Defamation League (led by Abraham Foxman) sought
to honor New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, who had expressed
support for the Oslo accords and called for Israel to recognize Palestinian
claims, by inviting him to speak at its annual convention. Zionist
Organization of America president Morton Klein launched a protest, resulting
in a “barrage of hostile rhetoric” between himself and Foxman due to his
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belief that Friedman was “an enemy of Israel, someone who should not be
honored at a Jewish event.”63 The American Jewish community had truly
reached a new level of polarization in 1997 if Friedman, a prolific American
Jewish journalist who had devoted the majority of his career to reporting and
serving as an advocate on behalf of Israel, was being called an ‘enemy’ of the
Jewish State.
Of course, the increased polarization of the 1990s must be understood
within the context of the movement of Post-Zionism out of exclusively
intellectual circles and into mainstream political discourse. ‘Post-Zionism,’
simply put, is “a set of critical positions that problematize Zionist discourse,
and the historical narratives and social and cultural representations that it
produced.”64 Post-Zionism acknowledges the achievement of the original
Zionist mission and emphasizes the need to move beyond the ideal of a
‘Jewish’ state (or, at the very least, least beyond an expansionist Jewish state)
in favor of a more limited, pluralistic one. This conception of Post-Zionism
does not, by any means, challenge the existence of Israel or the ideological
bases of its foundation. Rather, ‘Positive’ Post-Zionism, as Danny Ben-Moshe
describes it, can be understood as “a political cultural process that seeks to
de-Judaise and de-Zionise Israel and is one that is manifest in materialistic
American culture.”65 In one sense, the discussions at Camp David in 2000 can
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be viewed as the final abandonment of the Revisionist Zionist ideology66 that
had dominated Israeli politics after 1967. Despite Arafat’s rejection of Prime
Minister Ehud Barak’s ‘generous offer’, the deal represented a significant
turning point for it signaled a return to the “classic, mainstream Zionist
position favoring territorial compromise with the Palestinian people, a
recognition of the basic legitimacy of their claim to self-determination and
acceptance of a partition of the Land of Israel/Palestine between Jews and
Arabs.”67 While the deal does not represent a wholesale embrace of PostZionism, it did bring the ideology into the political mainstream, as it moved
away from far-reaching Zionist ambitions and toward achieving ‘peace’ with
a sovereign, independent Palestinian state. Yet, because Post-Zionism does
not prioritize the ‘Jewish’ nature of Israel, its adherents on the political left
have often been labeled ‘anti-Semitic’ in both Israel and the United States.
In September 2002, Harvard University president Lawrence Summers
caused a stir among Post-Zionist intellectuals—most notably UC Berkeley’s
Judith Butler68—after publicly recognizing that “Profoundly anti-Israeli
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views are increasingly finding support in progressive intellectual
communities” and claiming that “serious and thoughtful people are
advocating and taking actions that are anti-Semitic in their effect if not their
intent.” Butler responded in 2004 with a book chapter entitled “The Charge
of Antisemitism,” in which she criticizes Summers’ distinction between
‘effective’ and ‘intentional’ anti-Semitism—a distinction she claims is
“controversial at best.”69 In her view, because nearly all anti-Israel views can
be interpreted and used for ‘effective’ anti-Semitism, Summers had “struck a
blow against academic freedom” because his charge would presumptively
extend to almost any “anti-Israel” viewpoint or action, including Boycott,
Divestment and Sanctions campaigns (in which Butler herself was actively
involved). It seemed, at that point, that views on Israel in the United States
had reached the apex of polarization. In both mainstream and intellectual
communities, critics of Israel were almost invariably met with charges of
anti-Semitism, and Jewish critics of Israel were met with the deplorable tag of
being “self-hating Jews.” There was little to no room for critics of the Israeli
government to identify themselves as ‘Pro-Israel’ in mainstream U.S.
politics—that is, until the end of George W. Bush’s second term in office.
In April 2008, former Clinton adviser Jeremy Ben-Ami founded J
Street—a non-profit lobbying organization that brands itself as “Pro-Israel,
Pro-Peace.” It’s goal was “to give a voice in American politics to those who
Peter Beinart encouraged in a 2012 New York Times Op-ed) but against the entire State of
Israel.
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believe that Israel’s future depends on a two-state solution.”70 Ben-Ami
draws upon his personal and familial connection to Israel as well as his
experience in policymaking to push forward with a ‘new voice’ that breaks
sharply from the traditional conception of what it means to be ‘pro-Israel’ in
the United States. Citing Washington’s experience with AIPAC and
evangelical pastor John Hagee’s Christians United for Israel (CUFI)
organization, Ben-Ami points out: “It’s no shock that a community so
fundamentally liberal and overwhelmingly moderate in its views on the
Middle East is perceived as monolithically hawkish and right-of-center when
it comes to Israel.”71 Short of being a ‘fringe’ group of activists, J Street has
established a Political Action Committee that lobbies on Capitol Hill, formally
endorses candidates, and was able to boast a $1.5 million budget in 2009—
miniscule in comparison to AIPAC’s $67 million annual budget, but more
flexible because it is able to donate directly to politicians’ campaigns,
whereas AIPAC can only hold ‘information sessions’ and donate money
through other political action committees it recognizes as having ‘pro-Israel’
stances. In the 2010 election, J Street endorsed and supported 61 federal
candidates, 45 of whom won their elections. By the end of 2011, J Street had
convened the third largest gathering of American Jews on the entire
continent at its Second National Conference in Washington, D.C.
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Ben-Ami’s J Street emerged and gained notoriety at a time when the
newly-inaugurated president Obama was staking out a new ‘vision’ for U.S.
involvement in the Middle East. In his June 2009 speech in Cairo entitled “A
New Beginning,” Obama linked the pursuit of a two-state solution with
American and international interests:
“The only resolution is for the aspirations of both sides to be met
through two states, where Israelis and Palestinians each live in peace
and security. That is in Israel’s interest, Palestine’s interest, America’s
interest, and the world’s interest. And that is why I intend to
personally pursue this outcome with all the patience and dedication
that the task requires.”72
Ben-Ami welcomed the position and expressed optimism that Obama would
“garner Jewish support in such a push specifically because many in the
Jewish community recognize that resolving the conflict is not only necessary
to secure Israel’s future, but also critical to regional stability and American
strategic interests.”73 Naturally, Ben-Ami’s vision of a ‘New Voice for Israel’
was met with considerable skepticism and intense criticism from the
traditional ‘pro-Israel’ community in the United States, most notably from
Harvard Law professor and acclaimed public defender of Israel Alan
Dershowitz.
However, what Dershowitz took issue with was not Ben-Ami’s
endorsement of a two-state solution, but rather his endorsement of General
David Petraeus’ assertion that ‘large-scale armed confrontations’ in the
Middle East were motivated mainly by anti-American sentiment brought on
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by “U.S. favoritism for Israel.”74 Such a statement has led right-wing critics to
conclude that the Obama administration is not really ‘pro-Israel,’ for the
more ‘hawkish’ supporters of Israel interpret the phrase to mean “providing
uncritical support for Israeli governments” and not “lecturing Israel on
what’s best for it, or applying any kind of pressure on it—both of which
President Obama has done.”75 Ben-Ami’s support of Petraeus’ claim (echoed
by Vice President Joe Biden) would earn him a scathing rebuke from
Dershowitz in the Huffington Post:
“As long as [J Street] was limiting its lobbying activities to ending the
settlements, dividing Jerusalem and pressing for negotiations, it could
plausibly claim the mantle of pro-Israel, despite the reality that many
of its members, supporters, speakers and invited guests are virulently
anti-Israel. But now that it has crossed the line into legitimating the
most dangerous and false argument ever made against Israel's
security, it must stop calling itself pro-Israel.”76
Dershowitz’s criticism is important because it allows that pursuing a
campaign to end settlements, divide Jerusalem, and press for negotiations
could ‘plausibly’ be called ‘pro-Israel’. For Alan Dershowitz, who had long
spoken out against the de-legitimization of Israel among U.S. intellectuals,
such an admission signaled an ideological re-positioning of ‘pro-Israel’
sentiments within the United States.77 Before 1993 (and even before 2000),
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the idea that one could openly advocate for a two-state solution, advocate
dismantling West Bank settlements and simultaneously call themselves ‘proIsrael’ would have been embraced only on the far left of the political
spectrum. However, two years into the Obama administration, this ‘new’
definition had gained considerable support, particularly among the younger
generation that had grown up in the post-Oslo era and had come of age
around the monumental U.S. election of 2008.
Ten days after Israeli Naval commandos boarded the Gaza-bound
Mavi Marmara sea vessel and killed nine pro-Palestinian Turkish activists
delivering humanitarian aid to the dilapidated party-state on the
Mediterranean, American journalist Peter Beinart published an essay in the
New York Review of Books that would spark controversy and debate
throughout the American Jewish community and, indeed, among all those
who had, at one point or another, considered themselves ‘pro-Israel’.
Beinart’s essay, “The Failure of the American Jewish Establishment,” is a
lamentation of what he sees as the ‘death of liberal Zionism’ in the United
States—a death that has all but silenced Jewish voices who speak out against
the policies of an increasingly religious, right wing, and ‘anti-democratic’
Israeli government. Beinart cites several studies conducted in the early-mid
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2000s which showed that “non-Orthodox younger Jews78, on the whole, feel
much less attached to Israel than their elders.”79 The most telling survey,
conducted by conservative pollster Frank Luntz, found that most
interviewees, broadly defined, were ‘liberals’ who believed in “open debate,
skepticism about military force, and a commitment to human rights. And in
their innocence, they did not realize that they were supposed to shed those
values when it came to Israel.”47 Although this broad sketch of a ‘dovish’
American Jewish youth has notable exceptions, it does coincide with the rise
in popularity of groups such as J Street, which boasted nearly 3,000
attendees at its third annual conference in March 2012—a quarter of which
were college students from more than 125 U.S. campuses.
Recent poll data indicates that the American Jewish community, on
the whole, has not moved en masse away from its historic ‘connection’ to the
state of Israel. A 2010 Brandeis survey found that a majority (63 percent) of
the American Jewish community indicated it still felt ‘very much’ or at least
‘somewhat’ attached to the state of Israel, with 37 percent feeling only ‘a
little’ or ‘not at all’ attached to Israel.80 However, under the age of 45, close to
50 percent indicate they have ‘a little’ or ‘no connection at all’ to Israel. 46
percent overall favor dismantling some or all of the settlements, although the
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study does not indicate how these opinions are divided among various age
groups. 37 percent disapprove of Obama’s handling of the U.S.—Israeli
relationship, with the same percentage (roughly—actually 38) ‘unsure’ about
it, and 25 percent responding they approve of how he has handled it. About
49 percent from the 18-29 age group indicated that they agreed with the
official Turkish statement following the flotilla raid in the summer of 2010—
which claimed that Israel had made an ‘unprovoked attack’ on innocent
civilians and had violated international law.
The American Jewish ‘establishment’ Beinart describes is one that had
traditionally defined what it meant to be ‘pro-Israel’ in the United States—
uncompromising on Israeli ‘security needs’ and generally rejectionist (or at
the very most, skeptical) toward a Palestinian state. But the prevalence of
‘liberal’ values among the American Jews (78 percent of which voted for
Barack Obama in 2008) has come to overshadow any lingering adherence to
this ‘old’ conception of ‘pro-Israel’. However, we must not confuse a
wholesale re-defining of ‘pro-Israel’ with a general increase in apathy toward
Israel within the context of U.S. politics. On April 3, 2012, the Public Religion
Research Institute published a survey of over 1,000 American Jewish voters,
among whom only 4 percent indicated that ‘Israel’ was the most important
issue in the 2012 presidential election, while 20 percent identified ‘support
for Israel’ as the most important quality to their Jewish Identity.81 The
largest portion, 46 percent, identified ‘a commitment to social equality’ as the
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most important quality to their Jewish identity—supporting Beinart’s claim
that American Jews check their ‘Zionism’ at ‘liberalism’s door.’
Conclusions
In examining the current state of American Zionism and American
conceptions of ‘pro-Israel’, I have identified three main factors in the shift
from the ‘old’ definition to the ‘new’ one. To review, the ‘old’ pro-Israel camp
was (and, in a sense still is) security focused, ambivalent or rejectionist
toward a Palestinian state, and embraces, above all else, the Jewish nature of
the State of Israel. The ‘new’ pro-Israel camp is focused on achieving ‘peace’
in Israel/Palestine, advocates for a two-state solution, and emphasizes, above
all else, the ‘liberal’ and ‘democratic’ nature of the Israeli State. Clearly, there
is room for ‘bleeding over’ between the two, but if we are to understand the
‘new’ definition as an ‘ideal’ or ‘form’ toward which we are moving, it follows
that in 2012 we are clearly still in a transitional period.
The Generational Divide: Post-1967, Post-Oslo
As Beinart noted in Failure, the polarization between ‘liberals’ and
‘Zionists’ within the American Jewish community is the direct result of
leading American Jewish institutions that have ‘actively opposed’ a brand of
Zionism that “challenges Israel’s behavior in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
and toward its own Arab citizens.”47 The generation that came of age in the
post-1967 euphoria had established a Zionism that rejected Palestinian
statehood and placed Israel at or near the center of Jewish communal
identity. Yet, after many American Jews found their dissenting opinions
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stifled and faced threats of being labeled ‘self-hating’ or ‘anti-Semitic’, an
emphasis on the liberal, democratic nature of the Jewish state broke into the
mainstream, especially as the ever-nearing and elusive ‘peace’ with the
Palestinians became more realistic after the 1993 Oslo accords. The
‘communal democracy’ that had characterized a politically active and
pluralistic American Jewish community before 1967 was effectively restored
by the late 2000s, offering a younger generation outlets for dissenting
opinions over Israeli policies and military campaigns that had hitherto been
considered taboo.
The Impact of Christian Zionism: Polarizing the ‘Pro-Israel’ Community
The emergence of evangelical Protestant Christian support for Israel
in the late 1970s and through the 1980s under the leadership of Jerry Falwell
resulted in a polarization of the ‘pro-Israel’ community in the United States
that would shape the subsequent polarization within the American Jewish
community. The restoration of Jewish control over the ancient ‘Land of
Israel’ God had promised to Abraham revitalized the emphasis on a
‘premillenial’ interpretation of the Second Coming of Christ. Christian
evangelicals enjoyed (and still enjoy) a healthy and fruitful relationship with
the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee and the right-wing Likud
governments of Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir and Benjamin Netanyahu
throughout their various tenures in that Christian Zionists provided
ideological and monetary support for settlement expansion in the West Bank.
As the prospect of a Palestinian state became imminent, however, the ‘pro-
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Israel’ Jewish left and ‘pro-Israel’ Christian right found themselves on
opposite ends of the political spectrum, with Christians continuing to
embrace an ideology closer to Revisionist Zionism of right-wing Israelis and
the Likud party. Thus, a strong relationship remains between the Israeli
right and the American Christian right, fostering the growth of continued
settlements in hopes of maintaining Jewish control over the entire Eretz
Israel, and perhaps more.
Re-Shifting of the Middle East: Arab Spring, Israeli Winter?
Barack Obama’s foreign policy toward the Middle East has been
largely characterized by a desire to re-define the U.S. relationship with Arab
states and, by extension, with Israel. His 2009 Cairo speech ushered in a new
era (it is no coincidence the speech was entitled “A New Beginning”—
essentially, a ‘clean slate’) in which U.S. ‘favoritism’ toward Israel was
acknowledged as a liability in reaching out to the greater Muslim world, a
thesis offered in John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt’s 2007 book The Israel
Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. Yet, after the uprisings in the spring of 2011,
Obama was presented with his very own ‘clean slate’ in several Middle
Eastern nations—offering him a chance, once again, to define the U.S.
relationship with Israel in terms that would not risk alienating nascent Arab
democracies. Obama’s call for a complete withdrawal of all Israeli troops and
settlers from the occupied territories in his May 19, 2011 address on the
Middle East represented the most direct challenge to the Israeli government
that any U.S. president (save, perhaps, Jimmy Carter) has ever put forth.
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American Jewish support for Obama’s re-election (62 percent among the
general Jewish population, 86 percent among those who voted for him in
2008, according to the PRRI poll81) indicates that Obama is serving their
interests of the with regard to U.S. policy toward Israel—meaning either that
Obama is sufficiently pro-Israel for the American Jewish community, or that
earning the label of ‘pro-Israel’ is no longer a prerequisite for Jewish support
in the United States.
The Future of ‘Pro-Israel’ in the United States
The emerging ‘new’ definition of ‘Pro-Israel’ in the United States does
not represent a radical change from the traditional definition of the term.
While the younger, post-Oslo generation of American Jews may have a more
overtly humanistic conscience in relation to Israel, they are nowhere near
abandoning Zionism, as Beinart would suggest. Moreover, the willingness to
criticize Israel’s policies applies almost exclusively to the issue of West Bank
settlements. On other issues—border security, a potential nuclear threat
from Iran, combatting terrorism—there is a greater consensus among
younger American Jews that errs on the side of unconditional support for
Israel. The principal difference, however, is that the current U.S.
administration is exerting unprecedented pressure on the Israeli government
in pursuit of a return to the ‘even-handed’ approach toward the Jewish state
that existed briefly between 1948 and 1967. While such an approach may
have meant political ‘suicide’ as recently as five years ago, it is now possible
(and perhaps, within the next decade, will be favorable) to gain majority
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support from the ‘Pro-Israel’ community through appealing to the moral
supremacy of achieving a two-state solution, rather than the supremacy of
ensuring the perpetual security of the Jewish state.

Summary
This project examines what I consider to be the changing nature of
American Jewish attitudes toward Israel. It was inspired by Peter Beinart’s
2010 essay “The Failure of the American Jewish Establishment,” which
suggests that traditional outlets of expressing support for Israel in the United
States were alienating a younger, more liberal-minded generation of
American Jewish students due to a lack of room for dissent over Israeli
policies—particularly the perpetuation of settlements in the West Bank
which preclude the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state alongside
an independent Jewish state of Israel. The debate generated from Beinart’s
article launched the discussion of what it means to be ‘pro-Israel’ in the
United States into mainstream media, political, and academic commentary.
The very nature of the debate implies there are multiple definitions of the
label ‘pro-Israel’—for both voters and policy makers—in the United States,
and certainly within the American Jewish community. In order to assess the
differences between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ conceptions of ‘pro-Israel’, I began
with a history of American Zionism—that is, American support for an
independent Jewish state or homeland in Palestine.
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The essay begins with early conceptions of Zionism in the United
States (particularly, the colonial period) which elevated America to the status
of a ‘New Israel’ for both English colonists and, to a lesser degree, European
Jewish immigrants, due to the unprecedented religious freedom offered.
Political Zionism—the goal of establishing a sovereign Jewish state that
would serve as a refuge from the anti-Semitism that plagued Europe—
emerged out of Austrian Journalist Theodor Herzl’s work Der Judenstaat
(“The Jewish State”), published in 1896. Herzl’s experience covering the
Dreyfus Affair (in which the Jewish French military officer Alfred Dreyfus
was falsely accused of treason) led him to conclude that European Jewry
could not escape the specter of anti-Semitism through assimilation and that,
therefore, the only option was to establish a political entity in the historic
Jewish homeland—Palestine. Thousands of Russian and Eastern European
Jews began to immigrate en masse to Palestine after the violent outbreak of
pogroms (violent riots against Jews) in 1881, and when Herzl convened the
First Zionist Congress in 1897, the prospect of establishing a Jewish state had
become a tenable idea among world Jewry. In America, however, the concept
of Zionism was adopted but with a condition—the support for a Jewish
homeland was not to conflict in any way with Jewish Americans’ allegiance to
their home nation, the United States. Because of this condition (established
by the Federation of American Zionists in 1898) the American Jewish
community did not fully embrace Zionism until after World War I, when the
British gained control of Palestine and anti-Semitism in the U.S. was on the
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rise. In the wake of the Holocaust (but not solely because of it), American
Jews widely supported the right of their coreligionists in Europe to pursue
the establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine, regardless of
the native population that lived on the land.
While the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 bolstered
American Zionist sentiments, it was not until 1967 that Israel became the
carrier of Jewish identity all over the world, and especially in the United
States. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) emerged in the
early 1950s, and gained political traction in the 1960s as presidents John F.
Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson began to openly support Zionism and the selfdetermination within the context of developing a close relationship with an
anti-Soviet power in the Middle East. After the 1967 War, Israel gained
control of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan
Heights. This victory imbued the American Jewish community with a
revitalized support for Israel and Zionism, so much so that the prolific
American Journalist Thomas Friedman concluded that Israel had “replaced
Torah, synagogue, and prayer as the carrier of their Jewish identity.” As
AIPAC grew and gained considerable influence, it became the norm that any
threat to cut U.S. aid to Israel (be it military or humanitarian) was viewed as
a threat to the security of Israel. Criticism of the Jewish state became more
taboo, and Jewish activist groups emerging in the 1970s that sought to
discuss the status of Palestinian refugees and settlements in the occupied
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territories were quickly marginalized and labeled as ‘anti-Israel’ and often
times ‘anti-Semitic.’
The 1967 War also animated the evangelical Christian community in
the United States—who viewed Jewish control over the ancient Land of Israel
as a sign of the second coming of Christ. In the late 1970s, pastor Jerry
Falwell (founder of the Moral Majority and largely associated with the ‘rise’
of the Christian Right) developed a close relationship with Israeli Prime
Minister and Likud Party member Menachem Begin. Falwell and the vast
majority of his evangelical followers lent both ideological and monetary
support to the newly-elected right-wing Likud government in Israel, which
pursued an active policy of settlement building in the West Bank. The
alliance between the American Christian Right and the Israeli Likud party
would work toward forming a rift in the ‘pro-Israel’ community in the United
States. Near the end of the 1980s, more Jewish activist individuals and
groups were beginning to accept a two-state solution, criticize Israel’s
invasion of Lebanon, and begin discussing the rights of Palestinians in the
Land of Israel—the land that Christian Zionists believe needs to remain
under Jewish control at all costs.
After Yasser Arafat recognized the Jewish state and signed the Oslo
Accords with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the two-state solution
became a mainstream idea within the American Jewish community. The Oslo
accords were met with resistance from the traditional ‘pro-Israel’ community
and especially evangelical Christians, and the late 1990s witnessed an
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unprecedented polarization of the ‘pro-Israel’ community in the United
States. Until 2008, there were few (if any) outlets for political activists or
academics to criticize Israel without risk of being called ‘anti-Semitic’ and
receiving public rebuke from AIPAC or the Anti-Defamation League. In 2008,
Jeremy Ben-Ami founded J Street, a political lobbying group that brands itself
‘pro-Israel, pro-Peace’ and seeks to change the conversation about Israel in
the United States. It breaks from traditional ‘pro-Israel’ organizations in the
United States because it prioritizes the achievement of a two-state solution in
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict rather than ‘ensuring Israel’s security’ as
AIPAC had traditionally promoted. The organization has had reasonable
success and has successfully lobbied to earn the support of over 70 members
of congress seeking a new way forward in U.S. involvement in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict.
Israel’s second invasion of Lebanon in 2006, its invasion of Gaza in
2008, and its raid on the Gaza ‘freedom flotilla’ in 2010 prompted further
discussion about the meaning of ‘pro-Israel’ in the American Jewish
community. Roughly ten days after the flotilla raid of 2010, Peter Beinart
published his essay in the New York Review of Books that claimed the
traditional Zionist political activists in the United States had alienated a great
number of younger American Jews, who saw Israel’s settlement activities as
an obstacle to peace and Palestinian self-determination.
To get a sense of the changing nature of ‘pro-Israel’ activism and
discourse among Jewish college students, I’ve supplemented this essay with a
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ten-minute video profiling two groups that are changing the conversation on
Israel in the United States. It includes footage from Jeremy Ben-Ami’s lecture
at the Jewish Community Center in Syracuse from November 2011 and an
interview with J Street U (J Street’s college branch) organizer Mimi Micner,
who spoke about J Street’s appeal to college students and the younger
generation of American Jews. Learning about Israel in the Middle East was
founded in Fall 2011 by a group of students seeking to foster an open
dialogue about Israel on campus, creating an outlet for Israel supporters and
critics alike to discuss critical issues facing Israel, the Palestinians, and other
Middle Eastern nations in a time of upheaval and radical change throughout
the region.

